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and Urban Violence in Developing Countries
Josjah Kunkeler, Centre for Conflict Studies, Utrecht University, The Netherlands
Krijn Peters, Department of Political and Cultural Studies, Swansea University, United Kingdom
Young people are major participants in contemporary intra-state armed conflicts. Since the end of the Cold War there has been a trend to portray these as 
criminal violence for private (economic) ends, rather than politically or ideologically motivated. Hence, the perception of young people’s role has moved from 
“freedom fighters” to “violent criminals.” Our discursive and conceptual reconsideration based on a case study of Sierra Leone finds that the associated di-
chotomies (“new war/old war,” “greed/grievance,” “criminal/political violence”) are grounded in traditional modernization assumptions and/or constructed 
for policy purposes, rather than reflecting reality on the ground. Urban and rural youth violence in developing countries cannot be separated from its political 
roots. Moreover, the violent dynamics in which urban youth violence is embedded challenge our conceptions of what an armed conflict is. Including this form 
of violence in mainstream conflict theory would open the way for a new interpretation and more effective policy interventions. Extrapolating the experience of 
Latin American cities plagued by drug violence, the recent and significant increase in drug trafficking on the West African seaboard could mark the beginning 
of another armed conflict with high youth involvement, this time playing out in urban settings.
Demographically speaking, developing countries are young 
countries. Where most developed countries are confronted 
with an ageing population – and must find solutions to 
overcome increasing demands on elderly care and/or the 
affordability of pension schemes – developing countries are 
confronted with an opposite demographic layout and with 
a rather different set of problems and challenges. Nowhere 
is this more apparent than in Sub-Saharan Africa where the 
majority of the population is below 25 years of age, with 
the youth category (15–25 years) making up at least 20 per-
cent.1 This poses significant challenges to a region already 
characterized by limited development and weak states. A 
youth bulge – as it manifests itself in Sub-Saharan Africa – 
requires considerable efforts by states to create education 
(secondary and tertiary) and employment opportunities 
for its current and next generation of young people. It can 
also contribute to urbanization, as young people are more 
mobile and may more easily leave their village to look for 
work or education in one of the bigger towns or cities, with 
the unlucky ones ending up living from hand to mouth in 
ever expanding slum areas. The magnitude and the rapidity 
of this phenomenon is clearly illustrated by the following 
figures: from an urbanization level of just 11.1 percent in 
1950, current (2010) urbanization in Sub-Saharan Africa 
stands at 37.3 percent and is expected to reach 60.5 percent 
by 2050.2
Political instability has further added to population move-
ments and urbanization. Civil conflict – now the most 
common type of armed conflict in the world – often results 
in large groups of refugees and internally displaced per-
sons. As of 2008 the total number of refugees was esti-
Part of this article is based on Josjah Kunkeler’s MA 
thesis, written to conclude an MA in Conflict 
Studies and Human Rights at the Centre for Conflict 
Studies, Utrecht University. Special thanks go to her 
1 See http://www.un.org/esa/population/.
2 See http://www.un.org/esa/population/.
supervisor, Dr. Berma Klein Goldewijk, whose sharp 
observations and eye for detail have contributed to 
the clarity, depth and correctness of the arguments 
made here.
IJCV : Vol. 5 (2) 2011, pp. 277 – 291
Kunkeler and Peters: Youth, Armed Conflict and Urban Violence in Developing Countries 279
mated at 10 million, with the number of internally 
displaced persons 26 million – many of them children and 
young people (Dupuy and Peters 2010, 25). Moreover, 
young people are also major participants in armed con-
flicts, with ultra-young combatants – that is child soldiers – 
especially active in African conflicts (Dupuy and Peters 
2010). The Sub-Saharan Africa region has been particularly 
affected by political instability over the past twenty years: 
while the number of armed conflict and wars globally has 
been gradually declining since 1992, Sub-Saharan Africa 
continued to experience high numbers of armed conflicts 
throughout the 1990s (Human Security Report Project 
2008). Given the nature of many of these intra-state con-
flicts – with fighting going on in rural or mining areas – 
capital cities often provide a safe haven with at least some 
degree of order and stability, increasing the level of urban-
ization even further. Moreover, humanitarian aid – if it is 
delivered in the first place – is most readily available in or 
near urban centres for logistical reasons, adding another 
incentive to move to these places. Once peace is achieved, 
not all refugees and internally displaced persons are willing 
or able to return. Many of the cities and capitals in Sub-
Saharan Africa countries which have experienced (or are 
still experiencing) armed conflict have doubled, tripled, or 
even quadrupled in population, presenting a particular set 
of challenges to development and security.
Being a subnational site, violence within cities will gen-
erally be interpreted as criminal in nature, and thus ex-
cluded from mainstream (social) conflict analyses and 
tools. However, especially since 9/11, the city has acquired a 
more prominent role on the security agenda and has been 
included as a site of violence in relation to the so-called 
“new wars.” Within these analyses, cities are seen as the key 
sites in the “non-traditional,” “asymmetric,” “informal,” 
or “new” wars (Kaldor 1999 in Graham 2004, 3). Warfare, 
in other words, “is being urbanized [and] urban areas are 
now the ‘lightning conductors’ for the world’s political vi-
olence” (Graham 2004, 4). Indeed, if anything, 9/11 has 
proven that cities are vulnerable sites for outside threats. 
Violence within cities is nothing new, as cities are tradi-
tionally imagined as a site of crime. However in the context 
of mass migration, failing states, post-conflict societies, and 
long term issues around exclusion, poverty and inequality, 
urban violence is taking on excessive forms (Moser 2004). 
Added to this, the international commodity markets and 
“shadow economies” have created a new problem for many 
West African cities: drug trafficking and its accompanying 
violent social structures. In general, violence has reached 
unprecedented levels in many cities of the South, and is in-
creasingly seen as one of the most portentous threats to de-
velopment on a local, national, and international scale 
(Winton 2004).
It is against this general background and in relation to ex-
periences in other major cities dealing with excessive viol-
ence that we explore the case study of Sierra Leone and 
pose the question: is Freetown – or for that matter, any 
other capital city in war-affected West Africa now used for 
drug trafficking – on the verge of becoming another Rio 
the Janeiro or Johannesburg? All of the points raised above 
can be found in this particular case: a youth bulge; limited 
educational and employment opportunities for young 
people; high incidence of child and youth combatants: a 
decade-long civil conflict mainly playing out in rural areas; 
large internally displaced person and refugee populations3; 
a quadrupling of the capital’s population within a ten-year 
period; and finally a new security threat due to the emerg-
ence of drug trafficking combined with high youth un-
employment rates. We will argue that the conflict in Sierra 
Leone and its particular post-war challenges can only be 
understood by acknowledging that there is a crisis of youth 
– in fact, we argue that young people in Sierra Leone ex-
perience a double crisis. We then make a case for the need 
to critically scrutinize the so-called “new war” concept 
(Kaldor 1999) and its apparent dichotomy of “criminal 
versus political violence” (with the new wars characterized 
by criminal violence and the so-called old wars – or 
pre-1990 conflicts –characterized by political violence). In-
stead, we argue that “new war” violence can be as politi-
3 During the course of the conflict more than half 
of the population was displaced (internally or ex-
ternally) at one point or other.
IJCV : Vol. 5 (2) 2011, pp. 277 – 291
Kunkeler and Peters: Youth, Armed Conflict and Urban Violence in Developing Countries 280
cally motivated as “old war” violence, making these 
dichotomies of limited value for the analysis of con-
temporary armed violence. It appears that both greed and 
grievance are part of armed conflicts, in old as well as new 
wars, and in urban violence.
Through quantitative analysis, scholars conclude that there 
has been a “dramatic global decline in political violence 
since the end of the Cold War” (Mack 2005 in Newman 
2009, 255). Current conceptualizations, however, are in 
need of more refinement, as Newman states that “there is 
less room for optimism about other forms of low-intensity 
conflict and serious violence which falls outside con-
ventional definitions of civil war” (2009, 256). This article 
homes in on these observations through examples of viol-
ence in (West) African and Latin American cities, extra-
polating findings to the case of Freetown, Sierra Leone. 
Drawing on ethnographic research concerning cities in the 
South that reveals the realities of urban violence – as op-
posed to general interpretations thereof – we suggest that 
much of today’s urban youth violence, particularly in third 
world cities, should be interpreted (conceptually) as armed 
conflict, since it is characterized by high levels of organiz-
ation, produces well over one thousand deaths per year 
(per city) and is the product of socio-economic marginal-
ization of young people and its associated grievances, but 
also at times of “greed” or criminal agendas.
1. Conflict in Sierra Leone
In March 1991 the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) 
entered Sierra Leone from neighbouring war-affected Lib-
eria, and plunged the country into a horrendous armed 
conflict. Over the following eleven years it fought success-
ively against an authoritarian regime, a military regime, 
and a democratic regime, and collaborated with another 
military regime after finally signing a peace accord with the 
reinstalled democratic government. The conflict is gen-
erally perceived as one of the first so-called “New Wars” 
(Kaldor 1999). Starting just after the end of the Cold War, 
the conflict in this small West African country satisfied all 
five “New Violence” characteristics identified by Chris 
Allen (1999, 9–11): the various armed groups targeted pre-
dominately civilians rather than rival armed groups; the vi-
olence and atrocities committed by all factions – and in 
particular the RUF which quickly made the amputation of 
the limbs of their victims by machete their trade-mark 
atrocity – showed extreme brutality; the emergence and 
rapid growth of the traditional hunter-based civil defense 
forces (the “Kamajors”) clearly indicated the state initiation 
and sponsorship of violence; the role of the so-called “blood 
diamonds” which fuelled and according to some observers 
actually caused the war (Smillie et al 2000) underscored the 
motive of war as business rather than a matter of political 
or social grievances; and finally, the particular way in 
which the factions operated (including the government 
army) – with commanders leading through personal auth-
ority rather than military hierarchy – could be interpreted 
as typical of warlordism as first described in studies of war-
fare in ancient China.
The “war as business” explanation in particular found con-
siderable support among national elites and international 
observers. David Keen (1998, 2001) was among the first 
scholars to point out the role of local, national, and inter-
national economic interests in these “new wars” and show 
that the fighting in Sierra Leone was prolonged because 
certain categories of people (military and rebel com-
manders, businessmen and arms dealers, politicians) were 
benefiting financially from the insecurity and chaos in the 
country. Paul Collier – a professor at Oxford but at the time 
temporarily heading the World Bank’s Development Re-
search Group – however, “dismissed” political motivations 
or causes for many conflicts, arguing that it was “greed, not 
grievance” which characterized the conflicts emerging in 
the post-Cold War era. Collier shows – using statistical 
analysis of conflict countries in the 1965–99 period – that 
those countries that depended on primary commodity ex-
ports and had a low national income were particularly vul-
nerable to civil war. For Sierra Leone Collier found further 
evidence in the fact that during the 1999 peace negoti-
ations, the rebel leader demanded to become the Minister 
of Mining (2001, 146). In line with Collier, Smillie et al. 
(2000) argue that the war in Sierra Leone was the result of a 
criminal conspiracy seeking to control the lucrative dia-
mond fields, rather than the result of an insurgency by a 
rebel movement motivated by political grievances. The ar-
gument that the rebel insurgency was a “criminal con-
spiracy after the country’s diamond wealth” was also taken 
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up by the prosecution at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
created after the war to bring to justice those who were 
deemed to bear the greatest responsibility for the war.4
While it is likely that diamond revenue fuelled the conflict, 
given that all armed factions need some source of income 
to wage their wars, there is less evidence that the diamonds 
actually caused the war. For instance, a report by the Sierra 
Leonean organization No Peace Without Justice, presenting 
findings based on statements from more than four 
hundred witnesses who lived in war-affected districts, 
found very few instances of diamond mining by military or 
rebel personnel during the first years of the war (Smith et 
al. 2004). This increased significantly during the later 
stages, suggesting indeed that the opportunity for diamond 
mining fuelled the conflict once it was under way rather 
than acting as a cause and motivation from the outset 
(Peters and Richards 2011). The Sierra Leone Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission concluded that “it was years of 
bad governance, endemic corruption and the denial of 
basic human rights that created the deplorable conditions 
that made conflict inevitable,” (TRC 2004, 10) and that 
“the exploitation of diamonds was not the cause of the 
conflict in Sierra Leone; rather it was an element that 
fuelled the conflict” (TRC 2004, 12).
Among the proxies used by Collier as an indicator of greed 
are low levels of secondary education and high levels of 
(male) youth unemployment: poorly educated youths 
without jobs, it is suggested, would be particularly inter-
ested in accumulating resources through warfare, since 
there are few if any other avenues open to them and their 
opportunity costs are thus low. While these two proxies can 
and have been contested as indicators of greed agendas 
(Arnson and Zartmann 2005) – that is, they could equally 
indicate grievances – they do nevertheless point to an im-
portant characteristic of the conflict in Sierra Leone: the 
majority of the combatants involved in the conflict were 
young (including significant numbers of under-age com-
batants). Humphreys and Weinstein (2004) find that the 
majority of the combatants fall into the youth category and 
have a rural background. The crucial role (rural) youth 
played in the conflict, and understanding their motivations 
as one of the root causes of the conflict were first flagged by 
Paul Richards in 1996. Richards shows that following the 
collapse of the neo-patrimonial state in Sierra Leone before 
the war, many young people lost the opportunity to benefit 
from education or to secure employment. This resulted in 
grievances, which in turn made them more vulnerable to 
militia conscription and the insurgents’ rather simplistic 
ideology of “free education, free medical care” and “jobs 
for all” (RUF/SL 1989, 1995). Peters (2006, 2011) later 
identifies a double crisis faced by youth in Sierra Leone: 
not only were their educational and employment hopes 
crushed by a contracting national state but they also found 
themselves marginalized through (labour) exploitation at a 
local level by landholding elites (mis)using customary law. 
Obviously the use and abuse of customary law was most 
pertinent in rural areas.
Whether because of the state’s inability or because of its 
lack of commitment, young people all over the developing 
world are experiencing massive challenges. The 2007 World 
Development Report, Development and the Next Gener-
ation (World Bank 2007), states that there are 1.3 billion 
young people now living in the developing world – an un-
precedented - number – and that about half of the young 
people globally (which includes developed countries) are 
unemployed,5 with at least 10 percent of them not even 
able to read or write (meaning that they did not have access 
to primary let alone secondary education). While youth 
unemployment in itself does not lead to armed conflict – 
although research has shown an increased risk of armed 
conflict in countries experiencing a high youth bulge com-
bined with a high young male unemployment rate, and a 
higher risk of riots if this coincides with great urban in-
equalities (Mclean-Hilker and Fraser 2009) – it could be ar-
gued that in the case of Sierra Leone, where youth 
experienced an additional crisis, it became a particular per-
nicious situation with a rebellion of an extremely des-
4 http://www.sc-sl.org/ (accessed December 2011). 5 For instance, North Africa and the Middle East 
alone must create 100 million jobs by 2020 to cater 
for their youth. (World Bank 2007).
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tructive nature as the outcome. This second crisis 
experienced by youth – whether specifically through the 
exploitation of youth via customary law or more generally 
through gerontocratic control over the means of pro-
duction (and reproduction, that is marriageable partners) 
– is particularly visible in Sub-Saharan Africa. Indeed, 
Henrik Vigh (with reference to Guinea-Bissau) calls the in-
ability of young people to gain a reliable income, marry, 
and have children, and thus become an adult, a “social mo-
ratorium” caused by “generationally asymmetric control 
over access to resources” (2006, 96). 
The 1999 Lomé peace accord, the 2000 Abuja ceasefire and 
the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration pro-
gram for combatants hardly recognized this double crisis 
experienced by most of the youthful fighters in Sierra 
Leone.6 Both the peace accords and the DDR program were 
formulated at a time when the “greed, not grievance” ex-
planation was particularly dominant. As a result, any genu-
ine grievances of youthful combatants and war-affected 
youth were easily dismissed as a fabricated explanation to 
justify their participation in an atrocious war (Mkandawire 
2002). Rather ironically, the Government of Sierra Leone – 
with the support of the UK’s Department for International 
Development (DfID) – embarked on a “chieftaincy restor-
ation programme” to rehabilitate and reinstall the power of 
the paramount chiefs and customary law more generally 
(Jackson 2007), and by so doing reinstated the very causes 
of the war, according to its youthful protagonists (Richards 
2005). About half of the ex-combatants who registered for 
DDR opted for the skills training reintegration package, 
which included training in trades such as carpentry, tailor-
ing, or car mechanics (NCDDR 2004). But six to nine 
months of training proved insufficient to compete in a 
post-war economy that was already at a low ebb. As a result, 
most of the ex-combatants were unable to acquire a liveli-
hood through their newly acquired skills, and, after selling 
their DDR toolkit, drifted to the mining areas – where they 
at least could sell their labour – or the urban centres (Peters 
2007). From a pre-war population of around half a million, 
the country’s capital Freetown increased to about two mil-
lion inhabitants during and after the war (Shepler 2010). In 
the city the youthful ex-combatants have even fewer oppor-
tunities to secure a livelihood than in the mining areas and 
often have to survive through informal networks and con-
tacts, frequently dating back to the time when they were still 
under arms. From a remarkable low level straight after the 
war, crime rates have increased annually, with armed crime 
causing particular concern. More recently, Sierra Leone – 
like other coastal West African states – has been facing an 
additional security threat through drug trafficking. With 
smuggling routes via the Caribbean more closely monitored 
by national police forces, often in collaboration with Euro-
pean and North American police forces (and/or Interpol), 
South American drug lords have diverted cocaine destined 
for the European and American markets to West Africa. 
From here it is trafficked on, perhaps teaming up with 
human trafficking networks (Aning 2007). Guinea-Bissau is 
already labeled a “narco-state.” In 2007 President Koroma 
of Sierra Leone declared that the three biggest single threats 
to the security of his country were youth unemployment, 
drug trafficking, and corruption (Peters 2008). It is not hard 
to see that there is a connection between these and the real 
potential of drug money to undermine the difficult process 
of rebuilding a “failed state.” While domestic use of drugs is 
still limited (UNODC 2007, 23; Bøås and Hatløy 2005), it is 
clear that there is a real possibility of Freetown turning into 
another Sao Paulo or Bogota, with youth-cum-drug gangs 
becoming part of the urban landscape. If so, young people 
will again be victims as well as perpetrators, just as they 
were during the civil war a decade ago. But while there was 
some recognition of their grievances after the war – follow-
ing sensitization campaigns by civil society organizations 
and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to challenge 
the narrow interpretation of a war motivated by greed – 
there is little chance that young people’s predicaments and 
the grievances that lead to involvement in crime and drug-
trafficking will be recognized.
6 For details of the Lomé Peace Accord, see: 
http://www.sierra-leone.org/lomeaccord.html (ac-
cessed December 2011). For the Abuja Ceasefire 
Agreement, see: http://www.sierra-leone.org/cease
fire1100.html (accessed December 2011)
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With the above in mind, we make two arguments: Firstly, 
the so-called new wars are not necessarily bereft of any 
political agenda, although it may not necessarily take the 
shape of an easily recognizable ideology. In the case of Sier-
ra Leone it was the grievances of young people without 
prospects for proper education or employment who ex-
perienced socio-economic marginalization and ex-
ploitation by a gerontocratic rural elite abusing customary 
law and tradition. Secondly, we propose that the high levels 
of violence experienced in many urban centres also reflect 
economic and social grievances, rather than merely a greed 
agenda or a criminal and/or psychopathic propensity for 
violence. In the case of Sierra Leone, lack of institutional 
reform in rural areas continues to produce migration of 
young people to the cities, where – if left without any sup-
port – they become particularly vulnerable to groups in-
volved in illicit activities or criminal networks. In other 
countries that experienced increasing urbanization further 
in the past, the relationship between urban violence and a 
rural crisis might no longer be clearly identifiable, although 
this does not mean that it was not there in the first place.
2. Youth Gangs and Urban Violence
Urban youth violence and armed conflict are clearly separ-
ated – conceptually – in conflict literature through a 
“political versus criminal violence” dichotomy. However, 
following the case set out above we would argue that youth 
violence in many urban post-war settings – the extremely 
high levels of (youth) violence in South Africa or Brazil 
would be other good examples – is embedded within a 
conflict dynamic that demonstrates more similarities than 
differences with what is subsumed under the banner of 
“armed conflict.”. Indeed, drawing on insights gained 
through the “new war” debate, we find a number of simi-
larities that link urban violence to contemporary armed 
conflicts. A number of common factors and characteristics 
can be distinguished in many cities throughout the world, 
as well as within contemporary armed conflicts or new 
wars: the presence of non-state armed actors; the linkage of 
violence to the international commodity markets (both 
legal and illicit); conflict motivations that are not necess-
arily state-related; local forms of sovereignty and collective 
life; high levels of casualties; and finally, the crucial role of 
youth as armed actors. But why then are these still two sep-
arate categories? In other words: what impedes the in-
clusion of urban (youth) violence in mainstream conflict 
analyses and transformative methods? The literature on 
armed conflict prevention, analysis, and reconstruction is 
well developed it might prove of some use for under-
standing and addressing urban youth violence.
Clearly, urban youth violence – and urban violent dy-
namics in general – lack the traditional “conflict umbrella,” 
as these violent episodes find themselves detached from the 
nation-state in which they occur in terms of ideology, ac-
tors, and bounded territory; the city is a subnational site. 
Therefore, urban violence is generally framed and inter-
preted as criminal violence. Within a context of “state fai-
lure” or the inability of state representatives to provide 
security, the lives of inhabitants of cities such as Rio de Ja-
neiro and Johannesburg are constituted by a “culture of 
fear” (Koonings and Kruijt 2007) that is attached to issues 
of crime. Indeed, the “fear-of-crime rhetoric” (Lemanski 
2004, 103) stands at the heart of the dynamics which cata-
lyze urban violence. Through this interpretative frame – 
which is present at local, urban, and national level – re-
pressive, violent policing, vigilantism, and urban spatial 
and social segregation in the form of gated communities – 
which in turn spatially manifest and deepen social boun-
daries – are legitimized (Caldeira 2000). The crime frame 
and inability of the state to protect its citizens from this 
form of violence opens a market for the privatization of vi-
olence and frames slums and their inhabitants as violent 
enemies of the city, or “Others” (Lemanski 2004; Rodgers 
2006).7 One particular group in these slums is considered 
an enemy of the state: the youth gang (and the associated 
drug trade). Indeed, young people in these slums are often 
– due to lacking or unstable family structures, a lack of 
7 A shift from framing violence as “political” to 
simply “criminal” has opened the way for a number 
of violent actors that legitimize their actions 
through this crime frame. In Latin America for ex-
ample, where there is a legacy of a culture of viol-
ence, the “discourses about corruption” (Penglase 
2007, 319) justify a number of non-state armed 
groups and informal mechanisms of revenge viol-
ence and vigilante crime (Moser 2004, 12). Different 
actors and mechanisms constitute this culture of vi-
olence, such as “[s]lumlords [who] organize squads 
of armed mercenaries to exterminate crime on their 
premises” (Balán 2002, 1).
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education and opportunities, and race- and class-based 
discrimination – members of gangs, which have become 
increasingly linked to the international drug trade and with 
it have become increasingly militarized (Caldeira 2000; Jüt-
tersonke et al. 2009; Lemanski 2004).
Gangs composed of mainly young males aged 15–25 are a 
typical characteristic of contemporary cities of the South. 
These gangs provide young people with a sense of belong-
ing and social identity, and as they operate in shadow econ-
omies, make up for the lack of educational and job 
opportunities. Within gangs, young men find a way to 
make a living (see for example Jüttersonke et al. 2009). 
Mainstream research on gangs has focused on youth gangs 
as dominantly a Latin American phenomenon, yet many 
other cities in the South – characterized by an environment 
of exclusion, post-conflict reconstruction, and rapid urban-
ization – exhibit similar groups of (semi-)organized youth. 
In Kabul and Karachi, bands of (armed) youngsters – at 
times involved in international drug trafficking – have be-
come a characteristic of the urban landscape (Esser 2004). 
In Lagos, so-called “area boys” act as violent brokers in par-
allel structures, having created an income for themselves by 
guarding individual property or public space in a situation 
of lacking state security, and with it have become an ac-
cepted part of the urban landscape (Ismail 2009). Smith 
(2004, 128), discussing the case of the Bakassi Boys in 
southeastern Nigeria, clearly shows the socio-economic and 
political dimensions that gave rise to this phenomenon:
Vigilantism and the widespread popular support for it can be 
read as a response to the practices of the Nigerian state and the 
failures of democracy to deliver expected political and econo-
mic dividends. … On the other hand, vigilantism must also be 
read as an expression of discontent with regard to more tradi-
tional structures of patron–clientism as they play out in an era 
of centralized state power and heightened inequality in a popu-
lation that is younger, more educated and urbanized, and full of 
frustrated ambitions.
In many cities of the South, gangs initially filled up the gap 
left by state absence and acted as community builders with 
clear ideologies focusing on countering the negative effects 
of social and economic exclusion (Arias 2006). Gangs func-
tioned as state entities; they act as constructors of social 
cohesion and a sense of community, as police, judge, and 
executioner (Arias 2006; Dowdney 2003; Rodgers 2006; 
Salo 2006). Pinnock (1984) considers the gang subculture 
as an expression of and resistance to the 1980s African 
political economy. For South Africa this was the Apartheid 
regime and for many other Sub-Saharan Africa nations, 
(authoritarian) regimes implementing World Bank structu-
ral adjustment and austerity measures. Salo also points out 
how gangs act as community builders in South African 
townships, as they shape closed social, moral, and territorial 
boundaries (2006). Gangs thus function as parallel regimes 
and provide a sense of belonging and community for the 
slums in which they operate, for those excluded from state-
citizenship and state-based social structures through dis-
crimination, often based on the intersections of economic, 
geographical, and racial criteria. In popular perceptions, 
slum inhabitants, as well as their unorganized, poor lifestyle 
and illegal settlements, are often seen as “inhuman” inhab-
itants of the city (see for example Davis 2006). These geo-
graphical spaces are often closed communities, functioning 
as archipelagos within wider state structures. Generally, 
slum inhabitants are accorded no rights to the city nor state 
services for their illegal settlements, often excluding them 
from water or electricity networks, public transport, and 
wider social networks, making them a sort of “second rate 
citizens” (see for example Koonings and Kruijt 2007). 
Within this environment, “gangs are also an expression of 
social cohesion in peripheral communities” (Salo 2006, 
148). Indeed, according to Lund, what is specific to African 
societies in which state formation is a challenging process is 
the difficulty in “specifying what is ‘state’ and what is not . . 
. many institutions have a twilight character; they are not 
the state but they exercise public authority” (2006, 673).
Initially, gang violence was limited to occasional turf con-
flicts over territories. However, with the introduction of the 
drug trade to Latin America in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
more recently to African states, the character and image of 
gangs is changing rapidly. In Brazil, children as young as 
ten years old are incorporated in these factions as lookouts, 
messengers, and little drug carriers. Gradually, children and 
adolescents began to fill positions previously only held by 
adult traffickers. Many adult traffickers were imprisoned or 
killed, paving the way for more children to enter the drug 
trade as a full time occupation (Dowdney 2003). Likewise 
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in South Africa, Salo’s ethnographic research demonstrates 
that in the past gangs performed a policing function and 
provided youngsters with a form of social, gang, and com-
munity-based identities linked to the neighbourhood 
(2006). Nowadays however, “the gangs are being redefined 
primarily as economic units whose core business is illegal 
drug trafficking” (Salo 2006, 170). As with new wars, we 
can see here that non-state armed actors and non-state 
forms of sovereignty deriving initially out of grievances 
over social and economic exclusion have become increas-
ingly violent and catalyzed through economic motivations. 
Both greed and grievance have thus come to form a part of 
the conflict dynamics. We will return to this issue later.
Building on existing insecurities in an age of rapid neolib-
eral change and the introduction of organized crime in the 
slums, gangs are easily framed as criminal groups disrupt-
ing state security and thus become the scapegoats for a 
wide range of crises – social, political, economic – way 
beyond their scope and impact (Jüttersonke et al. 2009; 
Koonings and Kruijt 2007). These frames form the basis on 
which a vicious circle of violence and counter-violence has 
come to preoccupy the residents of cities of the South. Vi-
olence associated with slums increasingly reaches the weal-
thier parts of the cities, as the popular phrase la bala 
perdida – the stray bullet – in Brazil demonstrates. In many 
urban societies of the South the violence of “backward” 
people in the slums is now felt to be “spreading its tent-
acles” throughout the entire city (Penglase 2007). Respond-
ing to these insecurities, the public demands more 
repressive action. Violent raids in slums – carried out by 
on- as well as off-duty police officers organized in militias – 
often kill more innocent bystanders than they actually ar-
rest drug lords. Police officers in Latin American cities are 
known for their extra-judicial killings, which they are rarely 
punished for (Alston 2009, 2010; Human Rights Watch 
2009).8 This phenomenon is not confined to Latin Ameri-
ca, but is increasingly a characteristic of African cities and 
evolving into a global phenomenon (Alston 2010).
Youths, in cities North and South, are especially vulnerable 
to the administration of arbitrary and selective social order 
at the hands of the police, “due to the widespread per-
ception of “youth” as criminal” (Winton 2004, 173). The 
complexity of the situation is further deepened by the way 
many police officers are themselves organized in armed 
bands that either collaborate or compete with gangs over 
the drug trade.9 Police officers in other words, often main-
tain the very structures which they are meant to fight. 
Moreover, repressive methods appear to have had the oppo-
site effect as they forced gangs to become better organized 
and armed. Rio de Janeiro’s violence is characterized by:
paramilitary organisation at the local level, territorial and poli-
tical domination of geographical areas, high numbers of armed 
combatants (including ex-military men), a constantly armed 
presence in the communities they [drug factions] dominate, 
military grade weapons and levels of armed violence that kill 
well over 1000 civilians and combatants during a one year pe-
riod. (Dowdney 2003: 192)
What might have started as groups of youngsters hanging 
out on the street is now, with the introduction of the drug 
trade and repressive and violent policing, evolving into well 
functioning armed bands fighting for and over their neigh-
bourhoods, the profits of the drug trade and over the 
8 The state mechanism assigned with the protec-
tion and provision of security, the police, appears to 
have become an important factor of high crime 
rates. According to Winton: “in attempts to regain 
social order and power, the police may be involved 
in a form of vigilantism which extends to social 
cleansing, targeting groups of “undesirables” such as 
suspected criminals, youth gang members, street 
children and homosexuals [and] agents on the 
whole act with remarkable impunity” (2004, 173). 
In Brazil for example, the Rio and São Paulo police 
together have killed more than 11,000 people since 
2003 (Human Rights Watch 2009). In nearly all cases 
in which police have killed people while on duty, the 
officers involved report the shootings as “resistance 
killings” – legitimate acts of self-defense. The legit-
imacy of these “resistance killings” is however ques-
tionable, as research done by the Special Rapporteur 
(Alston 2009) and Human Rights Watch (2009) de-
monstrates, and a substantial portion of these 
shootings are in fact extrajudicial executions whose 
victims are foremost “young, male, black and poor” 
(Alston 2009, 7). Off-duty police officers pose the 
most severe threat to public security. Organized in 
militias or criminal organizations these grupos de ex-
termínio routinely commit extra-judicial executions. 
Furthermore, like the drug gangs, these militias ef-
fectively control entire neighborhoods, extort resi-
dents through security taxes, and are a major source 
of homicides and other crimes in Rio, including tor-
ture, corruption, and – in some cases – drug traf-
ficking (Human Rights Watch 2009). These acts of 
social cleansing are, however, difficult to prove. In 
Brazil, police impunity is rather the norm than the 
exception; of more than 7,800 complaints recorded 
by the Rio Police Ombudsman’s Office, only 42 led 
to criminal charges and only four to convictions 
(Human Rights Watch 2009).
9 In the case of Mexico, for example, there is evi-
dence of the involvement of the police forces and 
other security agencies in a range of illegal activities 
such as “graft, gambling, prostitution, smuggling 
and drug trafficking” (Pansters and Castillo Berthier 
2007, 40–41).
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grievances that united them in the first place. Grievances 
over discriminating and repressive raids in slums drove 
their inhabitants into the arms of the gangs, which them-
selves engage in retributive violence to protect their neigh-
bourhoods and avenge their loses, consequently provoking 
more repressive tactics and endorsing their dangerous 
image, culminating in a downward spiral of violence (Arias 
2006; Rodgers 2006).
This spiral has culminated in what could be termed an un-
declared war in cities between non-state organized armed 
actors among themselves, as well as a wide range of state 
administered forms of violence. Under a so-called “state of 
exception” (Agamben 1998) – in which the law is (tempor-
arily) infringed due to imminent emergency threats – viol-
ence is deployed against slums and their inhabitants which 
is easily as destructive and lethal as war-related violence. 
Within urban social dynamics, slums are discursively dehu-
manized and popularly considered as “barbaric” undevel-
oped spaces that contain “invalid” dangerous populations, 
which threaten the development and security of the valid 
spaces and populations of the city (Agamben 1998; Fou-
cault 2003; Samara 2010). Violence enacted towards these 
geographic spaces and populations is legitimated through 
their supposedly inhuman character, leading to a number 
of development projects, such as the construction of high-
ways, that bulldoze entire communities in a process starkly 
resembling urbicide (see for example Davis 2006; Graham 
2004; Shaw 2004). Furthermore, crimes considered “war 
crimes” under international humanitarian law and listed in 
the Rome Statute, such as social cleansing, torture, extra-
judicial killings, are well known strategies used by those 
concerned to “fight crime.”10 These “war crimes” take 
place, however, without the official conflict umbrella, thus 
eliminating them from the mainstream conflict analytical 
map. Moreover, like new wars, these violent social struc-
tures contest our notion of what a war is. Qualitative re-
search (see for example Alston 2009, 2010; Human Rights 
Watch 2009; Koonings and Kruijt 2007; Leeds 2007; 
Rodgers 2006) demonstrates that urban violence could – 
and should – be labeled as social conflict instead of crimi-
nal violence defined by individual pathologies. Placing 
local gang violence and state-administered violence within 
their wider social structures and linking their local dis-
courses and frames to wider global ones demonstrates their 
similarities to the social structures that are typical for 
armed conflict. This indeed raises the question, when is a 
war actually a war?11
3. When Is a War a War?
Considering that homicides in cities around the globe ex-
ceed the number of battle deaths in the average civil war 
(Cramer 2006), we should be wary to uncritically accept 
definitions as an accurate description of reality. Defini-
tional frames are often not purely descriptive, as they “may 
shape what is viewed and how it is interpreted” (Cramer 
2006, 51). This is especially important as categories fre-
quently reflect – or feed into – specific policy choices and 
demands (Kalyvas 2001). For instance, children involved in 
the drug trade suffer from higher mortality rates than their 
counterparts involved in armed conflict, but only child sol-
diers are recognized as a special group – for example under 
the 2000 Optional Protocol to the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child – making them more visible and thus 
facilitating NGO or government interventions (Dowdney 
2003). Contemporary definitions, categories, and the as-
sumptions on which these are based appear essentially 
state-centric and therefore often exclude sub-national lo-
cations as sites of war, of which the city is a prime ex-
ample. What we are seeing here is a global tendency in 
which not only the state’s monopoly on violence is chal-
lenged, but the state itself is challenged in its role as pro-
vider of security. Within contemporary armed violence, 
non-state armed actors and non-state forms of sovereign-
ty, non-state forms of identities to wage war for, and non-
state forms of security all challenge our notions of the 
10 In Brazil for example, the police are known for 
their dehumanizing and violent behaviour towards 
slum inhabitants. According to Amar “police in 
training still too often roll their eyes when human 
rights are mentioned, grumbling that human rights 
organizations are made up of the ‘usual suspects’ – 
homosexuals, feminists, and blacks sympathetic 
with narcotraffickers” (2009, 522). Within this en-
vironment “rights such as freedom from torture, 
summary execution or arbitrary arrest are routinely 
violated” by state officials (Penglase 2007, 306).
11 This question is borrowed from Cramer (2006), 
who asks himself in Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing 
when a war is not a war.
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state as the only representative of collective life and con-
sequently represent assumptions that define what a war is. 
Mainstream analysis and notions of state authority in Afri-
can societies often miss out on these phenomena; as Lund 
points out: “[o]rganizations and institutions that exercise 
legitimate public authority, but do not enjoy legal recog-
nition as part of the state, are out of focus” (2006, 675). 
Gangs in slums are the prime example of alternative forms 
of governance that are often hived off as criminal or illegit-
imate.
Not just urban violence, but contemporary conflicts in 
general demonstrate a discrepancy between assumptions 
and definitions concerning war and the realities of war. 
Whereas war was traditionally seen as a matter for states, 
national boundaries are increasingly transgressed and non-
state armed actors have become prominent players on the 
battleground. This makes contemporary conflicts and 
urban violence awkward objects of analysis, as they trans-
gress a number of constructed boundaries associated with 
war, spanning “legal vs. illegal, private vs. public, civilian vs. 
military, internal vs. external, and local vs. global” 
(Maleševi 2008, 98). Contemporary conflicts or new wars 
and urban violence therefore question the assumptions on 
which definitions are based.
When we examine the mainstream definition of armed 
conflict, we find that political violence is defined as viol-
ence associated with the nation-state, and violence per-
formed by or against a nation-state is considered political 
and for a public cause (Jabri 1996). Indeed, deconstructing 
the contemporary mainstream definition of armed conflict 
into its constituent parts reveals its state-centric funda-
ments. Armed violence is included within the category of 
armed conflict when it meets the following criteria:12
[a]n armed conflict is a contested incompatibility that concerns 
government and/or territory where the use of armed forces bet-
ween two parties, of which at least one is the government of a 
state, results in at least 25 battle-deaths. (UCDP/PRIO 2009, 1)
In other words, without state involvement or state con-
testation, a conflict cannot be considered an armed con-
flict and is consequently not political violence.13 These 
constructed boundaries culminate in three interrelated di-
chotomies: war vs. crime, political vs. criminal violence, 
and public vs. private association or motivations for viol-
ence that are essentially the basis of the new war paradigm. 
Within these dichotomies, a differentiation is made be-
tween killing for private gain and killing on the battlefield, 
of which the latter derives its legitimacy out of the per-
ception of being “undertaken in the name of an assumed 
collective just cause” (Jabri 1996, 105). This collective is 
defined by its national identity, hence the state-centric 
character of mainstream conceptions. However, in the case 
of African societies, “[w]hether labeled state or not, it 
seems that a wide variety of institutions constitute them-
selves as de facto public authorities” (Lund 2006, 676), 
thus questioning the definition of what can be considered 
public.
Contemporary interpretations of armed violence are em-
bedded in a general discursive shift that is constituted by a 
crime frame, and it is here that global and local discourses 
of violence interpretations are linked. Post-Cold War con-
flicts are seen as a departure from earlier forms of conflict 
(Kalyvas 2001) and violence previously framed as “politi-
cal” – through its perceived allegiance to Cold War ideo-
logies – is now simply framed as “criminal” (Harris 2003), 
as these conflicts appear to lack overt state involvement, 
state contestation, or a clear ideology. The new war para-
digm frames these conflicts as “highly decentralized” 
12 The literature on what exactly constitutes a 
“war” in mainstream conflict analysis is diverse and 
it appears there is no single agreed definition 
(Cramer 2006). Definitions of armed conflict vary 
on numbers of casualties and definitions of battle 
deaths. The definition provided by the Peace Re-
search Institute (PRIO) in Oslo is taken here as 
exemplary of a mainstream understanding of “war.”
13 According to this definition, a conflict has to be 
politically oriented, and to be so, association or in-
volvement with or of the state is necessary. Party for 
example in the above definition is operationalized as 
“a government of a state or any opposition organiz-
ation or alliance of opposition organizations” (Laci-
na and Gleditsch 2005, 162, italics ours). Opposition 
implies a relation to the government, as the party to 
be opposed to must be the state or a government of 
a state. Another example is the content of the in-
compatibility between these parties, which must 
“concern government and/or territory” (Lacina and 
Gleditsch 2005, 162). An incompatibility concerning 
government is operationalized as “concerning the 
type of political system, the replacement of the cen-
tral government, or the change of its composition” 
(ibid.). An incompatibility concerning territory con-
cerns “the status of a territory, e.g. the change of the 
state in control of a certain territory (interstate con-
flict), secession, or autonomy (internal conflict)” 
(ibid.).
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(Maleševi 2008, 98) as they are detached from the nation-
state in which they occur and their very existence is often 
linked to state failure and a lack of a state monopoly on vi-
olence (Jabri 1996; Maleševi  2008; Newman 2004). As we 
have seen that contemporary classifications of “armed con-
flict” define the nation-state as the centre of public life and 
the only legitimate public just cause to wage war for, new 
wars – often decentralized or local in nature – risk being 
classified as falling in the private realm, thus waged for pri-
vate causes, and thus criminal in nature.
However, the meaning of what is public and what is private 
– the general boundary that separates political from crimi-
nal violence and old from new wars – appears to be depen-
dent on the context in which conflicts are embedded, and 
need not be defined by a national element. Traditionally, 
the society of classical social theory – the self-contained 
nation-state – is the primary criterion for governance 
(Giddens 1987). Traditional modernization theory is em-
bedded within the belief that the nation-state is the “centre 
in society capable of shaping the entirety of social re-
lations” (Kaya 2004, 47). Collective social life, in other 
words, is constructed and naturalized around a national 
element which leads to a “state-administered ‘universal’ 
identity” (Baumann in Best 1998: 312). Being the sole rep-
resentative of collective life, the state is defined as the only 
legitimate violent actor. Contesting a state-centric ap-
proach, Bakonyi and Bliesemann de Guevara argue that 
contemporary conflicts find themselves on the margins of 
and beyond the state and for these actors “reference to the 
state is only one aspect” (2009, 398). According to Rodgers, 
multiple forms of sovereignty can coexist and non-state 
collectivities can form “micro-regimes of order as well as 
communal forms of belonging to definite albeit bounded, 
collective entities” (2006, 321). As such, Lund argues that 
in the case of African societies, it is useful to approach the 
phenomenon of public authority and governance not “as 
stemming from one single source, but rather to focus on 
how particular issues (security, justice, development, tax-
ation and others) are governed and which actors are en-
gaged in them” (2006, 682).
This allows us to think about the relationship between vi-
olence, order, and the state in a “less epistemologically 
constrained manner, along a continuum where the boun-
daries between the state and non-state forms of authority 
can become blurred” (Rodgers 2006, 317–18). Fur-
thermore, it allows us to define what is considered “pub-
lic” in a more context-sensitive manner, consequently 
approaching new wars, as well as urban violence, as social 
conflict instead of mere private criminality. In the case of 
urban violence, collectivities are not necessarily national, 
as slums are characterized by state absence and parallel 
 regimes.
When “political” violence is understood in broader terms – 
for example when one includes interethnic violence and 
the violent policing of marginalized impoverished and/or 
ethnic enclaves – cities are major, and indeed increasingly 
primary, venues for official policies of surveillance, co-
ercion, and security, as well as being sites of resistant tactics 
by those seeking to survive such policies (Amar 2009). The 
frame of criminality ascribed to new wars and urban viol-
ence is not random, but embedded within wider as-
sumptions and discourses that construct the category 
“armed conflict” and link it to the nation-state.
Furthermore, the boundary between war and crime ap-
pears normative rather than analytical, as warlike levels of 
violence do not apparently necessitate an official state of 
war. We should be wary of separating normative and politi-
cal definitions from analytical ones, as in many cities of the 
South, under a “state of exception,” war crimes and crimes 
against humanity are the reality of many. Especially in the 
case of young people this becomes a stressing issue as they 
have come to be seen as the main perpetrators of violence 
in cities and have become the main victims as well. How 
can these youngsters, and slum inhabitants in general, hope 
to see their human rights protected and crimes committed 
against them punished when those who are supposed to 
protect them are in fact the ones who attack them? These 
dynamics have confronted international law practitioners 
and as such in international customary law the meaning of 
“armed conflict” includes non-state armed violence. Ac-
cording to this definition, an armed conflict is found to 
exist “whenever there is a resort to armed force between 
States or protracted armed violence between governmental 
authorities and organized armed groups or between such 
IJCV : Vol. 5 (2) 2011, pp. 277 – 291
Kunkeler and Peters: Youth, Armed Conflict and Urban Violence in Developing Countries 289
groups within a State” (O’Connell 2008, 12, italics ours). 
Such a definition can inspire conflict resolution practi-
tioners and creates a space to link international conflict 
analytical, transformative, and legal tools to urban violent 
dynamics. Especially urban youngsters could benefit from 
such a shift, as their situation starkly resembles those of 
child soldiers in “official” conflict, but due to the lack of 
understanding of urban violence as social conflict these 
youngsters remain invisible on the mainstream conflict 
analytical map. Which tools, insights, and mechanisms – 
such as those already designed for child soldiers – do we as 
conflict resolution practitioners have that can be applied to 
urban youth?
4. Conclusion
Unfortunately, the number of young people who find 
themselves in extremely challenging circumstances in weak 
or post-conflict third world states where state support and 
provision are already limited is only likely to increase in the 
future. Responses vary, but can include active participation 
in armed violence (including urban violence). We have 
shown that the dichotomy between youth as “perpetrators” 
or “victims” is not very useful here (often they are both, or 
become perpetrators only after their human rights have 
been violated in the first place) and that other dichotomies 
– such as “political versus criminal violence” or “new war 
versus old war” are equally problematic and unhelpful. 
Rather, we suggest looking beyond these conceptual and 
constructed categories. This would allow us to better com-
prehend urban youth violence and to see the socio-
economic and political grievances that feed into it. This is 
necessary because, as we argue, policy-making and inter-
ventions are based (of course) on the understanding and 
conceptualization of what the problems and challenges are. 
We have used the case of Sierra Leone to illustrate the “cri-
sis of youth.” While Sierra Leone is a rather small country, 
it represents an interesting case for academics and policy 
makers. In 1994, the journalist Robert Kaplan wrote an in-
fluential piece that was published in the Atlantic Monthly 
(and forwarded to every American embassy in the world by 
order of the Clinton administration) warning against the 
world’s “coming anarchy” caused by environmental degra-
dation, unrestricted population growth, and resurfacing 
primitivism (1994). Kaplan took Sierra Leone as the prime 
example to illustrate his points (1996). While his “new Bar-
barism” thesis has been sufficiently refuted for Sierra Leone 
(see for instance Richards 1996), we should not “throw the 
baby out with the bath water.” A youthful population can 
be a significant and positive asset to a country and its de-
velopment, but if left to its own devices (or marginalized 
and exploited) can also turn against its country and be-
come a force of destruction, as the above examples have 
demonstrated.
Indeed, rapid urbanization, slums, youth gangs, and the 
negative effects of drug trafficking and use are char-
acteristic of cities throughout the world. In response, cities 
have become dominated by a fear-of-crime rhetoric that 
enables and demands repressive policing strategies. Com-
bined with the impact of the opportunities created by the 
shadow economy, urban violence in many cities of the 
South generates well over one thousand deaths per year per 
city, and draws in organized violent and armed actors 
ranging from youth gangs, police officers, militia groups 
composed of former military men, vigilantes, violence 
brokers, up to the level of politicians. Cities are becoming 
increasingly segregated into social and spatial archipelagos 
as fear of the “other” informs mutually interpretative 
frames of their inhabitants. Within these settings, it ap-
pears that urban youth is both the main perpetrator and 
victim of these violent dynamics, and questions arise about 
how to address and alleviate their vulnerable and danger-
ous position.
We have taken examples of other cities around the globe to 
open up analyses for Sierra Leone (or for that matter, any 
sub-Saharan city) and pose the questions: Is Sierra Leone, 
and specifically Freetown, transforming from a safe haven 
into a site of violence? Could a city like Rio de Janeiro show 
what Freetown could look like in a few years? Clearly the 
introduction of drug trafficking in West Africa will have an 
impact on these young people and their lives. We can learn 
from examples like Rio de Janeiro or Johannesburg. Ex-
ploring the benefits of non-state-centric analyses may be 
helpful in increasing our arsenal of preventive measures 
and policy interventions. There is a desperate need for 
more refined and inclusive definitions and categories to ac-
curately address the contemporary armed conflicts.
IJCV : Vol. 5 (2) 2011, pp. 277 – 291
Kunkeler and Peters: Youth, Armed Conflict and Urban Violence in Developing Countries 290
References
Agamben, G. 1998. Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press.
Allen. C. 1999. Warfare, Endemic Violence and State Collapse in Africa. Review of 
African Political Economy 81:376–84.
Alston, P. 2009. Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Ar-
bitrary Executions – Brazil. United Nations General Assembly.
Amar, P. 2009. Operation Princess in Rio de Janeiro: Policing “Sex Trafficking”, 
Strengthening Worker Citizenship, and the Urban Geopolitics of Security in 
Brazil. Security Dialogue 40:513–41.
Aning, K. 2007. Are There Transnational Organised Criminal Groups in West Af-
rica?: The Case of Ghana. Journal of Global Crime 8 (3): 193–212.
Arias, D. E. 2006. Trouble en Route: Drug Trafficking and Clientelism in Rio de 
Janeiro Shantytowns. Qualitative Sociology 29:427–45.
Arnson, C., and W. Zartman, eds. 2005. Rethinking the Economics of War: The In-
tersection of Need, Creed, and Greed. Washington, D.C., and Baltimore: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press and John Hopkins University Press.
Bakonyi, J., and B. Bliesemann de Guevara. 2009. The Mosaic of Violence – An 
Introduction. Civil Wars 11:397–413.
Balan, J. 2002. Introduction. In Citizens of Fear: Urban Violence in Latin America, 
ed. S. Rotker and K. Goldman, 1–6. New Jersey and London: Rutgers Univer-
sity Press.
Best, S. 1998. Zygmunt Bauman: Personal Reflections within the Mainstream of 
Modernity. British Journal of Sociology 49:311–320.
Bøås, M., and A. Hatløy. 2005. Alcohol and Drug Consumption in Post War Sierra 
Leone – an Exploration, Fafo-report 496. Oslo: Fafo.
Caldeira, T. P. 2000. City of Walls: Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship in Sao 
Paulo. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Collier, P., and A. Hoeffler. 2001. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. Washington, 
DC: World Bank, Development Research Group.
Cramer, C. 2006. Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing. London: Hurst.
Davis, M. 2006. Planet of Slums. Brooklyn: Verso.
Dowdney, L. 2003. Children of the Drug Trade: A Case Study of Children in Orga-
nised Armed Violence in Rio de Janeiro. Rio de Janeiro: Letras.
Dupuy, K., and K. Peters. 2010. War and Children: A Reference Handbook. Santa 
Barbara, CA: Praeger Security International, ABC-CLIO.
Esser, D. 2004. The City as Arena: Hub and Prey Patterns of Violence in Kabul 
and Karachi. Environment and Urbanization 16:31–38.
Foucault, M. 2003. Society Must Be Defended: Lectures at the Collège de France, 
1975–76. London: Penguin.
Giddens, A. 1987. The Nation-State and Violence. Cambridge: Polity.
Graham, S. 2004. Cities, War and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics. Ox-
ford: Blackwell.
Human Rights Watch. 2009. Lethal Force: Police Violence in Rio de Janeiro and Sao 
Paulo. http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/brazil1209webwcover.
pdf (accessed December 2011).
Human Security Report Project. 2008. The Miniatlas of Human Security. N.p.: 
World Bank and Human Security Report Project. http://www.hsrgroup.org/
our-work/publications/miniatlas.aspx (accessed December 2011).
Humphreys, M., and J. Weinstein. 2004. What the Fighters Say: A Survey of Ex-
combatants in Sierra Leone, June–August 2003, CGSD Working Paper 20. New 
York: Columbia University.
Ismail, O. 2009. The Dialectic of “Junctions” and “Bases”: Youth, “Securo-Com-
merce” and the Crises of Order in Downtown Lagos. Security Dialogue 
40:463–87.
Jabri, V. 1996. Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered. New York: 
Manchester University Press.
Jackson, P. 2007. Reshuffling an Old Deck of Cards? The Politics of Local Gov-
ernment Reform in Sierra Leone. African Affairs 106 (422): 95–111.
Jütersonke, O., R. Muggah, andD. Rodgers. 2009. Gangs, Urban Violence, and Se-
curity Interventions in Central America. Security Dialogue 40:373–97.
Kaldor, M. 1999. New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era. Cam-
bridge: Polity.
Kalyvas, S. N. 2001. “New” and “Old” Civil Wars: A Valid Distinction? World 
Politics 54:99–118.
Kaplan, R. 1994. The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, 
and Disease Are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet, Atlantic 
Monthly, February, 44–76.
Kaplan, R. 1996. The Ends of the Earth, a Journey at the Dawn of the 21st century. 
New York: Random House.
Kaya, I. 2004. Modernity, Openness, Interpretation: A Perspective on Multiple 
Modernities. Social Science Information 43:35–57.
Keen, D. 1998. The Political Economy of War. Paper given at Workshop on Econ-
omic and Social Consequences of Conflict, Queen Elizabeth House, Univer-
sity of Oxford.
Keen, D. 2001. War and Peace: What’s the Difference? International Peacekeeping 
7 (4): 1–22.
Koonings, K., and D. Kruijt. 2007. Fractured Cities: Social Exclusion, Urban Viol-
ence and Contested Spaces in Latin America. London: Zed.
Lacina, B., and P. Gleditsch. 2005. Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New 
Dataset of Battle Deaths. European Journal of Population 21:145–66.
Leeds, E. 2007. Rio de Janeiro. In Fractured Cities: Social Exclusion, Urban Viol-
ence and Contested Spaces in Latin America, ed. K. Koonings and D. Kruijt, 
23–35. London: Zed.
Lemanski, C. 2004. A New Apartheid? The Spatial Implications of Fear of Crime 
in Cape Town, South Africa. Environment and Urbanization 16:101–12.
Lund, C. 2006. Twilight Institutions: An Introduction. Development and Change 
37(4): 673–84.
Maleševi, S. 2008. The Sociology of New Wars? Assessing the Causes and Objec-
tives of Contemporary Violent Conflicts. International Political Sociol-
ogy 2:97–112.
McLean Hilker, L., and E. Fraser. 2009. Youth Exclusion, Violence, Conflict and 
Fragile states: Report Prepared for DFID’s Equity and Rights Team. N.p.: Social 
Development direct. http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/CON66.pdf (accessed 
December 2011).
Mkandawire, T. 2002. The Terrible Toll of Post-Colonial “Rebel Movements” in 
Africa: Towards an Explanation of the Violence Against the Peasantry. Jour-
nal of Modern African Studies 40 (2): 181–215.
Moser, C. 2004. Urban Violence and Insecurity: An Introductory Roadmap. En-
vironment and Urbanization 16:3–16.
NCDDR. 2004. National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-
integration: Final Reports. Freetown, Sierra Leone.
Newman, E. 2009. Conflict Research and the “Decline” of Civil War. Civil Wars 
11:255–78.
O’Connell, M. 2008. Initial Report on the Meaning of Armed Conflict in Inter-
national Law. Rio de Janeiro Conference. International Law Association 
Committee on the Use of Force.
Pansters, W., and H. Castillo Berthier. 2007. Mexico City. In Fractured Cities: So-
cial Exclusion, Urban Violence and Contested Spaces in Latin America, ed. K. 
Koonings and D. Kruijt, 36–56. London: Zed.
Penglase, B. 2007. Barbarians on the Beach: Media Narratives of Violence in Rio 
de Janeiro. Crime, Media, Culture 3:305–25.
Peters, K. 2006. Footpaths to Reintegration: Armed Conflict, Youth and the Rural 
Crisis in Sierra Leone. PhD diss., Wageningen University.
Peters, K. 2007. Reintegration Support for Young Ex-Combatants: A Right or a 
Privilege? International Migration 45 (5): 35–59.
Peters, K. 2008. Country Chapter: Sierra Leone. In Africa Yearbook: Politics, Econ-
omy and Society South of the Sahara in 2007, ed. A. Mehler, H. Melber, and K. 
van Walraven, 177–185. Leiden: Brill.
Peters, K., and P. Richards. 2011. Rebellion and Agrarian Tensions in Sierra 
Leone. Journal of Agrarian Change 11 (3): 377–95.
Pinnock, D. 1984. The Brotherhoods: Street Gangs and State Control in Cape Town, 
Cape Town: David Philip.
Richards, P. 1996. Fighting for the Rainforest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra 
Leone, reprinted with additional material 1998. Oxford: James Currey.
IJCV : Vol. 5 (2) 2011, pp. 277 – 291
Kunkeler and Peters: Youth, Armed Conflict and Urban Violence in Developing Countries 291
Richards, P. 2005. To Fight or to Farm? Agrarian Dimensions of the Mano River 
Conflicts (Liberia and Sierra Leone). African Affairs, 104/417, 1–20, 2005
Rodgers, D. 2006. The State as a Gang: Conceptualizing the Governmentality of 
Violence in Contemporary Nicaragua. Critique of Anthropology 26:315–30.
RUF/SL. 1989. Basic Document of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone 
(RUF/SL): The Second Liberation of Africa. N.p.
RUF/SL. 1995. Footpaths to Democracy: Towards a New Sierra Leone. N.p.: The 
Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone. www.sierra-leone.org/foot
paths.html.
Salo, E. 2006. Mans Is Ma Soe: Ganging Practices in Manenber, South Africa, and 
the Ideologies of Masculinity: Gender, and Generational Relations. In States 
of Violence: Politics, Youth, and Memory in Contemporary Africa, ed. E. G. Bay, 
and. D. L. Donham. London: University of Virginia Press.
Samara, T. 2010. Policing Development: Urban Renewal as Neo-liberal Security 
Strategy. Urban Studies 47:197–214.
Shaw, M. 2004. New Wars of the City: Relationships of “Urbicide” and “Geno-
cide”. In Cities, War, and Terrorism: Towards an Urban Geopolitics, ed. S. Gra-
ham, 141–53. Oxford: Blackwell.
Shepler, S. 2010. Child Labour and Youth Enterprise: Post-War Urban Infrastruc-
ture and the Bearing Boys of Freetown. Anthropology Today 26 (6): 19–22.
Smillie, I., L. Gberie, and R. Hazleton. 2000. The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone, 
Diamonds and Human Security. Ottawa: Partnership of Africa.
Smith, D. J. 2006. Violent Vigilantism and the State in Nigeria: The Case of the 
Bakassi Boys. In States of Violence: Politics, Youth, and Memory in Contempor-
ary Africa, ed. E. G. Bay andD. L. Donham. London: University of Virginia 
Press.
Smith, L., C. Gambette, and T. Longley. 2004. Conflict Mapping in Sierra Leone: 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law from 1991 to 2002. No Peace 
Without Justice, preliminary edition for the opening of the Special Court for 
Sierra Leone courthouse, March 10, 2004.
TRC. 2004. Witness to Truth: Report of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission. Freetown, Sierra Leone.
UCDP/PRIO. 2009. Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook. Uppsala, Sweden, and 
Oslo, Norway.
UNODC. 2007. Cocaine Trafficking in West Africa: The Threat to Stability and De-
velopment (with special reference to Guinea-Bissau). December. Vienna, Aus-
tria.
Vigh, H. 2006. Navigating Terrains of War: Youth and Soldiering in Guinea-Bissau. 
New York and Oxford: Berghahn.
Winton, A. 2004. Urban Violence: A Guide to the Literature. Environment and 
Urbanization 16:165–84.
World Bank 2007. World Development Report 2007: Development and the Next 
Generation. Washington DC.
Josjah Kunkeler
josjahkunkeler@gmail.com
Krijn Peters
k.peters@swansea.ac.uk
